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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The statement of issues and statement of the case are se*
forth in Brief of Appellant at pages 1 through 3.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT MISSTATES THE NATURE OF THE CASE,
Defendants claim that plaintiff is seeking a "declaratior

of coverage."

However, plaintiff is not merely seeking a declara-

tion of coverage, but rather a claim for bad faith on the part of
the insurance company in denying coverage and all damages stemming
from the denial of coverage.

Defendants have attempted to couch

this case in simple terms of a valid denial of coverage.

However,

the case has at its core elements of bad faith and intentional
manipulations by the defendants in an attempt to hide essential
facts and to deny plaintiff coverage.

Throughout defendant's brief,

defendant is elusive as- to the true nature of this case.

This

dilution technique used by the defendant will be explained in this
reply brief.
Defendant also claims in the statement of the case that
plaintiff had failed to renew the policy.
Utah's renewal statute should apply.
(1953 as amended).

See Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-17

However, this is not a simple case of failure to

renew an insurance policy.
significance.

Plaintiff claims that

The term renewal has specific legal

Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-14(2) defines renewal as "the

issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy replacing at the end
1

)f the policy period a policy previously issued and delivered by the
same insurer . . . but any policy with a policy period or term of
Less than 12 months shall for the purpose of this act be considered
as if written for a policy period or a term of 12 months.11
phasis added) .

(Em-

Therefore, a policy which has on its face a six

nonth renewal is required by statute to be deemed a one year renewal
policy.
In determining what notice is required in the present
case, one looks not to Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-17 which states the
requirements for notice upon non-renewal of a policy, but rather to
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-16 which is the notice of cancellation of
policy provision, applied when a policy is cancelled rather than not
renewed.

That section requires at least 10 days notice of cancel-

lation prior to the termination of a policy.

In the present case,

plaintiff has testified that he received no such notice of cancellation.

(R. 300, 313). Plaintiff's affidavit was not rebutted with

any other affidavits from the insurance company.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 31-41-19 provides that proof of mailing to the named insured is
sufficient proof of notice.

However, no proof of mailing has been

provided by the insurance company in the present case.

Defendant's

have skirted this issue by claiming in their statement of facts that
"defendant's mailed to plaintiff a 'Notice of Cancellation—Nonpayment of Premium' which stated that the policy would terminate on
May 15, 1984, if payment was not received in full."

(Appellee's

Brief, p. 2). This does not say, however, that defendant's mailed
2
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DEFENDANTS MAKE MATERIAL MISTAKES IN THEIR
REPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS OF THIS CASE,
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(R. 166-170).

Defendant's have claimed

:hat this information is privileged, and have refused to provide the
.nformation.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted

)rior to the court ruling on plaintiff's outstanding requests for
jroduction of these documents.

Therefore, it seems scandalous to

illow defendant's to argue that plaintiff has not proved payment
/hen defendants may in fact have in their possession evidence of
payment.
III.

PIAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT RELIES UPON A CASE READILY
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE.
Defendant's explanation of Larsen v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d

1151 (Utah 1981) dampens and dilutes the facts in an attempt to
strengthen the analogy.

However, a more lucid explanation of the

facts reveals a sharp contrast between Larsen and the present case.
In Larsen, an employer provided insurance for his employees.
was

absolutely

provided

with

coverage.

no
a

employee

book

participation.

detailing

the

Each

specific

There

employee

was

requirements

for

The book provided that the employees be "working as full

time employees, 40 hours per week."

Id. at 1153.

The facts state

that plaintiff received and read the handbook at the outset of his
employment.

The

employee,

in contemplation

of changing jobs,

discussed his eligibility for continued coverage under the policy.
The employee therefore was completely aware of the possibility that
he would not be covered.

Additionally, the employee could have

discussed the matter with a personnel officer or other official of
the company.

Once the employee left his full time status within the
4

0.

^^u^

^^W1^,^„

- iployer stopped a

~w^

employee

premium payments en ffl.i * - •" "

a

<~*- premiu~

- - •

•

,
^

> smpiu)",

4d& In

-iiupioyees son died en Januai

* ; .-<*

formed the bas:s for tiie employee " '• «" ' M M

:: :ire i n s u r a n t proceeds under -1
r ^:,
Lose

.in Larsen.

insurance

;f

one

company

u i.th

,1^1 therefore
j

in

December,

and

eaiJi

acts

tor

coverage.

n,i

and

nature of his

t

*ri

i"-

sharp

contrast t "

• nt J *

,' 'ii"'iui ,'

"-n aoirni

> »KJIK.,,>

The

however,

ol

u

payments.

,n

Larsen

In

s-.u ' " "M11

L his employment,

insurance

relationship

111 "u'unq

ani

u* 1 th a book which specified the

employee

'

iv-Li1 lui'mii n-

Li
1'he

.1. *i uact nu sue!1 handbook, but relied en

• ojeiir.

conduct

employer 'm 1

"

n

'

ouinani

tu

1 -f.^hlish

w 11 11 H company.

>

L

Also, the

iib|ju.saj a persunnel officer and other officials

company

to

iiscuss possibilities of non-coveraqe l:1

jobs.

In the present case, fhp

relied

sole]

>>

« "

iiisuiance carrier.
status with the
tiie present

had

'irijjj uj tc wuo provided

I'Ja nt i f 1

Jn

'1 Ln in *•

> v<

received and read t.hn handbook

cT

in

1 I J U ; U 1" 1 a the piesent cibe

• i,m|Mu,

because

requirements

the

-•. e

1 i*ijuiar payments to I ne In :i"i,t'nice company witt" the exception

expectation
juarsejU

i.^

In Larsen. the employee made nri payment,3 tu Line

.I1!'] ''.he insuran
nidiitfu

.

pi n u 1

f

'1

jut, conduct

,,l

I • «n

ouxibej.
' l.c*

L

' ^nd.rt,

In Larsen, once the employee left n 1 ^ m i l
11

e«i * 1 •

nr rflymen* ,
r | ni ! rr

lir-'

- r1 '

1 i .1 make

5

a payment

1

11
his
hn

H-ILJ.JUM

which

would

in

have

rovided

coverage,

but

the

insurance

company

denied

coverage,

Ithout notice, claiming that no payment was received.

The only

dmilarity between Larsen and the present case is that payments were
tade over a period of time. However, the employee had no reasonable
expectation of coverage since no premium payments were made on his
>ehalf, and since he knew that if he was not a full time employee he
zould not be covered.

This knowledge prevented proof of reliance.

Cn the present case, the plaintiff had made a payment which was to
provide coverage and then received coverage for a period of months.
ie relied to his detriment upon those payments by not safeguarding
all receipts of having made the premium payments.

Additionally, he

las incurred medical expenses which he otherwise would not have been
able to afford because the defendant lulled him into a sense of
security by providing coverage.
IV.

THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER COVERAGE
EXISTED.
To clearly focus on plaintiff's reasonable expectation

that coverage existed at the time of the accident, an examination of
the

specific

schedule

of

payments

on

the

policy

is helpful.

Defendant's contend that $40.12 would have been required to keep the
policy in effect.

This is based on a notice of cancellation which

states a cancellation date of May 15, 1984.

However, at the bottom

right hand corner of the notice there is a space provided with a
heading "Date Mailed11.
heading.

(R. 130).

There is no date above this

It is plaintiff's contention that this notice of cancella-

tion was not sent until well after May 15, 1984.
6

Therefore, the

only document in plaintiff's possession was a bill for his regula
monthly payment.
$18.00.

That regular monthly payment was usually aroun

If the plaintiff had mailed $18.00 plaintiff would hav<

paid for coverage at the time of the accident.
The reason the $18.00 would have provided coverage durinc
the time of the accident is best explained by examining the "Explanation

of

Account"

provided

through

discovery

requests.

Ir

November, 1983, plaintiff made a double payment so as to be, ir
effect, one month's payment in advance.
tiff failed to make a payment.

In December, 1983, plain-

However, in January, 1984, plaintiff

again made a double payment.

Therefore, as of January, 1984,

plaintiff was still one month in advance on his payments.

In

February and March plaintiff made regular monthly payments.

In

April however, plaintiff did not make a payment.

His payment that

he had made in advance would have been applied for this month.
Therefore, plaintiff, at the end of April was current in that he had
coverage, but had used up his advance payment.
plaintiff made the payment
insurance company.

In May, 1984,

required by his statement

from the

That amount was roughly $18.00 and would have

provided coverage for the month of May, even though plaintiff no
longer had an advance payment.

That is why on the "Explanation of

Account," to compute a balance of $40.12 owing, one must include an
additional deposit which would not have been required until after
May.

Defendant's know of this accounting system and the method of

paying and remaining one month in advance of payments due.
7

There-

Core, it is disingenuous to argue that it is irrelevant whether
plaintiff had mailed the $18.00 payment.

That $18.00 payment would

tiave provided coverage through the month of May.

$40.12 would have

only been required to remain an additional month in advance on
payments and would have provided coverage through June.
Additionally, defendants beg the question regarding proof
of payments.

Defendants claim that, "since plaintiff is unable to

document the payment, it would be impossible for defendant to do
so.11

(Appellee's Brief, p. 8).

Plaintiff cannot prove payment

through documentation since defendant's had lulled plaintiff into a
false sense of security by providing coverage over an extended
period of time.

Also, defendants have refused to produce documents

which may.in fact either prove or lead to proof of payment.
therefore illogical to claim that since plaintiff

It is

is unable to

produce documents showing payment, it would be impossible for the
defendant to do so.

Plaintiff believes he can show through dis-

covery that under defendants computer system it would be highly
unlikely and almost impossible

for defendants to allow coverage

unless payment was received.
V.

THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD PLAINTIFF WILL
PREVAIL ON A BAD FAITH CLAIM.
Defendant's claim that no duty existed between plaintiff

and defendant with regard to the policy in question.

However,

defendants skirt the concerns the Utah Supreme Court stated in Beck
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

8

Plaintiff's

bad

faith

claim

rests

in

part

upon its

allegation that defendants not only wrongfully denied coverage, but
mailed a notice of cancellation long after its marked expiratior
date.

In essence, plaintiff alleges that defendants committed a

blatant fraud upon the plaintiff by sending a notice of cancellation
long after coverage was extended.
Also, defendants lead plaintiff to rely to his detriment.
Defendants admitted coverage and plaintiff retained medical help he
could not otherwise afford.

Defendant's paid for medical help for

four months and then suddenly put stop payment on one of their
checks which had been issued for one of plaintiff's medical providers.

(R. 126). This left plaintiff with outstanding medical bills

which were incurred on the belief that defendants would pay them.
These bills are still unpaid and have injured plaintiff's credit
rating.

When defendants decided to cancel they should have at least

paid the medical expenses incurred up to that time.
Defendants not only stopped payment on a check but threatened Mr. Godoy with suit if he did not return all money he had
received from the defendants as well as all money his health care
providers had received from defendants.
not have the money.

(R. 128).

Mr. Godoy did

Farmer's bad faith occurred because it knew Mr.

Godoy had relied as anyone in his position would and knew the
mistake,

assuming

arguendo

it was

a mistake,

in covering the

accident was Farmers, yet it tried to force Mr. Godoy to pay for the

9

tiistake by himself.

Defendants did not act reasonably in denying

:he claim as required by Beck,
Additionally, defendant's, in an attempt to cover up their
fraud and wrongdoing would not produce documents necessary and vital
to plaintiff's claim that a payment was mailed and that defendants
knowingly and wrongfully sent notice of cancellation late and have
attempted to cover up or obscure that fact, and that defendants
acted in bad faith by acting unreasonably in denying the claim.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, and all the reasons set
forth in the opening brief, appellant, Rudolfo Godoy asks the court
to reverse its denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or
in the

alternative

to reverse the court's granting of

summary

judgment against the plaintiff.
Respectfully Submitted,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL', P.C.

- [ILL * mL
DentW M. Hatchl
7
Attorney for Rudolfo Godoy
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